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Bad Ethics, Good Ethics and the Genetic
Engineering of Animals in Agriculture
Bernard E. Rollin1
Colorado State University, Fort Collins 80523-1781
ABSTRACT: Genetic engineers have been remiss
in addressing ethical and social issues emerging from
this powerful new technology, a technology whose
implications for agriculture are profound. As a conse-
quence of this failure, society has been uneasy about
genetic engineering of animals and has had difficulty
distinguishing between genuine and spurious ethical
issues the technology occasions. Many of the most
prominent concerns do not require a serious response.
On the other hand, concerns about a variety of
possible risks arising from genetic engineering of
animals require careful consideration and dialogue
with the public. Such concerns are an admixture of
ethics and prudence. A purely ethical challenge,
however, hitherto not addressed, is represented by
problems of animal welfare that arise out of geneti-
cally engineering agricultural animals. A principle of
“conservation of welfare” is suggested as a plausible
moral rule to guide such genetic engineering.
Key Words: Animal Welfare, Ethics, Genetic Engineering
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Introduction
The advent of biotechnology has provided society
with what could become the most powerful technologi-
cal tool ever possessed by humanity. The public
response to biotechnology, however, has not been
overwhelmingly positive, and a good many social and
ethical concerns must be addressed before it will be
acceptable to society in general.
Primarily because 20th-century science has tended
to distance itself from ethical issues, these issues have
been defined for the public by others, sometimes in
inaccurate ways. Three very different sorts of issues
must be examined and addressed regarding genetic
engineering of animals: the claim that it is intrinsi-
cally wrong; the claim that it is dangerous to society
and nature; and the claim that it is likely to produce a
good deal of suffering for animals. Each of these
claims will be examined in the context of animal
agriculture.
The Denial of Ethics in Science
Genetic engineering is perhaps the most powerful
technology ever devised by humans. Although still in
its infancy, its potential for affecting health, the
environment, the food supply, and the very nature of
humans and animals is clear. Whereas scientists
generally greet these prospects with unbridled en-
thusiasm and excitement, the general public is far
more guarded and equivocal in its response. In this
presentation, I discuss some fundamental issues that
must be dealt with in order to both bridge this gulf
and ensure the orderly development of one aspect of
this technology of direct concern to animal science, the
genetic engineering of animals.
In a recent book (Rollin, 1995), I articulated what I
call a “Gresham’s law for ethics.” Gresham’s law, it
will be recalled, asserts that bad money will drive
good money out of circulation. In other words, if people
are faced with the option of paying a debt with either
of two currencies of the same face value, they will pay
with the one possessing the least intrinsic value. A
parallel phenomenon occurs in ethics: given a new
situation for which no consensus understanding of the
moral problems involved exists and given that the
situation naturally demands articulation and discus-
sion of such issues, the most shrill and dramatic
articulations of these problems will tend to seize the
center stage. We in the United States have seen this
occur in a variety of newly emerging social issues,
such as the use of animals in research, concern with
the environment, the advent of women’s issues and
radical feminism, issues of diversity, issues regarding
homosexuality. In the absence of ethically informed
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expertise to counter and moderate the distortions
inherent in such formulations, they tend to dominate
the social mind and drive the legitimate ethical
concerns out of its awareness.
This is, of course, what has occurred vis à vis
genetic engineering in general, and the genetic
engineering of animals in particular. Center stage has
been occupied by lurid sound bites calculated to
frighten and titillate: “Genetic engineering is playing
God”; “Genetic engineering is against nature”;
“Genetic engineering does not show proper respect for
the gift of life”; “Genetic engineering breaches species
barriers and violates species integrity.” As empty of
content and undefended as these assertions may be,
they fill the ethical lacuna in social thought and
become entrenched and difficult to counter, and they
essentially define the universe of moral discourse for
the society.
Much of the blame for this unfortunate state of
affairs in the arena of genetic engineering must be
laid at the feet of the research community. Part of the
problem arises from its insularity and distance from
the general public. Even more of the problem comes
from scientists’ disavowal, in theory and practice, of
responsibility for the ethical and social issues raised
by new developments in science and technology.
As I have demonstrated (Rollin, 1989),
20th-century science has deliberately distanced itself
from social ethical issues in both theory and practice.
Nascent scientists are taught that science is value-
free, that, in the words of one biology textbook
(Keeton and Gould, 1986), “science cannot make
value judgements”; that ethical judgments fall within
the purview of at worst politicians and at best society
in general, but not within the activities of the
scientific community. This doctrine, which is a major
part of what I have called the ideology or common
sense of science, is historically based in a laudable
caveat: not to admit into science meaningless, un-
verifiable assertions of the sort about “life force” or
“absolute space” that pervaded 19th-century science.
But however laudable its intentions, the results have
generated problems, as we shall see.
In practice, scientists follow this ideology and rarely
discuss ethical issues occasioned by their activities in
courses, journals, conferences, or other forums. As a
result, they end up taking indefensible ethical posi-
tions without realizing that they are doing so—
witness James Wyngaarden’s remark that “genetic
engineering should not be hampered by ethical
considerations” (Michigan State News, 1989), or the
numerous versions of the claim that animal use in
science is not an ethical issue, it is strictly a scientific
question.
In theory and practice, scientists’ adherence to this
ignoring of ethics runs afoul of ordinary common sense
and public sensibilities; regulating research on human
and animal subjects and genetic engineering provide
instructive cases in point. In addition, the way is
paved for opportunists to define the issues in a
manner to which it is difficult to respond and from
which it is difficult to recover.
What must be indelibly marked by agricultural
scientists is that science was not, is not, and can never
be value-free, or even ethics-free. When massive
amounts of public money are funneled into AIDS
research rather than into curing baldness, or when the
study of the relationship between race and intelligence
is socially disallowed, the subject matter studied by
science is determined by social ethical values. When
biomedical research is performed on rats rather than
on unwanted children, and the control of pain in these
rats is socially mandated, the method of science is
determined by social ethical values. And when the
degree of statistical reliability demanded in science
fluctuates when one is testing the efficacy of a new
human drug vs when one is testing a new survey
instrument, one again sees the influence of ethics.
Experimental design, acceptable sample sizes, and
acceptable confidence intervals will vary greatly
across different types of research because of moral
concerns, even when similar sorts of questions are
being asked. Thus the very logic of science is
modulated by social ethical concerns.
Similarly, genetic engineering of animals raises
significant social ethical concerns that the agricultural
science community must address, else these issues
will be erroneously defined by others. I have already
mentioned such spurious issues, but it is worthwhile
to briefly indicate why they are illegitimate.
The Spurious Ethical Issues Raised
by Genetic Engineering
The average person, indeed sometimes even the
average scientist, will inevitably raise the issues of
“playing God” when asked about the ethical issues
occasioned by genetic engineering of animals. I would
argue that neither this nor any variation of this
represents a genuine ethical issue. To be sure, the
creation of new forms of life may be offensive or even
immoral to certain theological traditions, but that
does not mean that such activity represents an ethical
problem in secular society not ruled by that tradition.
If “playing God” in this area is intrinsically wrong, it
is hard to see why damming rivers, eradicating
smallpox, and building cities is not also wrong. As a
matter of fact, there are numerous theologians from a
variety of traditions who do not see genetic engineer-
ing as inherently wrong.
One can similarly dismiss, at least on a rational
level, the claim of various religious leaders that “the
gift of life from God, in all of its forms and species,
should not be regarded solely as if they were a
chemical product subject to genetic alteration and
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patentable for economic benefit” (Crawford, 1987).
Such a dictum contains no argument or even clear
statement of what is allegedly problematic; until these
are forthcoming, the position cannot be taken seri-
ously. The same is true of Jeremy Rifkin’s claim that
genetic engineering “desacralizes nature” (Rifkin,
1985).
One can similarly dismiss Rifkin’s and others’
jeremiads about the intrinsic wrongness of “violating
species integrity” or “crossing species barriers” (Rif-
kin, 1985). In actual fact, we know that species are
not the fixed, immutable rigid building blocks of
nature that Aristotle and the Bible believed them to
be, but “snapshots” of a dynamic natural process.
Species evolve; why then is it intrinsically wrong for
humans to participate deliberately in that evolution,
especially when we have been doing it since we
evolved, unwittingly by serving as a selection pressure
on other organisms and contrivedly by domestication
and by cultivation, preferential propagation, and the
whole panoply of artificial selection? Indeed, it is
estimated that 70% of grasses and 40% of flowering
plants were “created” through human artifice, and
vast numbers of animals have been drastically modi-
fied (witness the dog).
Theology and environmental philosophy probably
provide the unseen skeleton underlying the objection
about species integrity. In the case of environmental
philosophy, which is a dominant mode of thought in
contemporary society, much is made out of the point
that species should not be allowed to vanish as a
result of human activity. It is a psychologically small
step, albeit a conceptually vast one, to move to the
view that species ought not change at human hands, a
position for which no adequate defense exists.
There is another concern sometimes voiced by those
who allege the intrinsic wrongness of genetic engineer-
ing of animals. Theological types, in particular, object
to the “mixing of human and animal traits” (Craw-
ford, 1987). Presumably, this means the insertion of
human genetic material into animals, or the insertion
of animal genetic material into humans. The former
has occurred; as we shall discuss later, the human
growth hormone gene was inserted into animals in
order to create meatier, leaner animals. To my
knowledge, the latter has not been attempted.
What, precisely, is intrinsically wrong with such an
admixture? We have certainly inserted animal parts
into the human body to treat disease, pig heart valves
and pig skin for example, and we routinely use animal
products for medical purposes. Suppose that an
animal were found that contained genes for prevent-
ing cancer (sharks, allegedly, are tumor-free). Sup-
pose, further, that this gene produced no untoward
effects in humans; indeed, its only effect was to confer
immunity against neoplastic disease. Why would such
gene transfer be wrong in and of itself? Similarly, if
the case were reversed, and the gene were transferred
in the other direction, from humans to animals to
instill disease-resistance, it is difficult to see why this
would be morally problematic. To be sure, when the
human growth hormone gene was transferred to
animals, it caused animal disease and suffering, and
thus such transfer was wrong because of its effects.
But one has still not shown that in and of itself such
transfer is wrong.
Issues of Risk in Genetic Engineering of Animals
The above sorts of objections, claiming that genetic
engineering of animals is intrinsically wrong, have
fueled the gap in social thought about genetic
engineering of animals in the absence of forthright
articulation of genuine concerns by the scientific
community. We have argued that none of these claims
of intrinsic wrongness represent legitimate concerns.
Nonetheless, there are genuine issues of risk to
humans and to the environment growing out of genetic
engineering of animals that must be addressed and
managed for the technology to be socially acceptable.
The issues discussed above can be resolved if the
biotechnology community undertakes such serious and
genuine dialogue with the general public on all
aspects of this technology, which I believe it must do
to survive.
It is vital that discussion of such risks and their
management not be restricted to “experts” but rather
involve the general public, perhaps through local
community review. The general public does not trust
experts to articulate risks, to assess their likelihood,
or to manage them: they have lived through too many
Chernobyls, too many Challengers, too many killer bee
escapes. In agriculture, the public has seen the
unexpected consequences of DDT, the unanticipated
contamination of ground water from herbicides, pesti-
cides, and fertilizers, and the unexpected spillage of
millions of gallons of hog manure in North Carolina
during the summer of 1995, despite assurances from
experts that it could not happen. And indeed, the
public has a point—scientists tend to get cavalier
about risks in their area; ask any university biosafety
officer. Scientists furthermore tend to minimize the
danger of unanticipated consequences of new technol-
ogy or believe that they can fix them with further new
technology, whereas members of the general public
fear the unknown and tend to believe that technologi-
cal fixes generate new and unanticipated conse-
quences. Failure to involve the public in such risk-
management discussion is very likely to result in
rejection of genetic engineering. This has already
occurred with bST and with Campbell’s genetically
engineered tomato. Jurassic Park should provide a
parable for genetic engineers.
Potential dangers emerging from genetic engineer-
ing of animals obviously stem from the rapidity with
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which such activity can introduce wholesale change in
organisms. Traditional “genetic engineering” was done
by selective breeding over long periods of time,
allowing ample opportunity to observe the untoward
effects of narrow selection of isolated characteristics.
With the techniques currently available, however,
scientists are doing their selection “in the fast lane,”
and thus we may not detect the problematic aspects of
what we are doing until after the organism has been
widely disseminated.
Another way to put the same point is that with
traditional breeding, there is an enforced waiting
period necessarily associated with attempts to incor-
porate traits into organisms. In the animal arena,
especially, one can significantly change animals from
the parent stock, but it will take many generations to
do so, during which time one has ample opportunity to
detect problems with the genome one is creating, or
with its phenotypic expression. To be sure, as occurred
with the breeding of many pure-bred dogs, one may
choose to disregard the untoward effects. But the point
is, one could see the problems developing if one cared
to do so. With genetic engineering, however, one can
insert the desired gene in one effort, and the problems
that emerge may be totally unexpected.
There are many instances of this, in fact, even in
traditional breeding. One famous example of this
concerns corn, and grows out of the phenomenon
known as pleiotropy, which means that one gene and
its products controls or codes for more than a single
trait. In this case, breeders were interested in a gene
that controlled male sterility in corn, so that one could
produce hybrid seeds without detasselling the corn by
hand, which is very labor-intensive. So the gene was
introduced to provide genetic detasselling. Unfor-
tunately, the gene also was responsible for increased
susceptibility to Southern Corn Blight, a fact of which
no one was aware. The corn was widely adopted, and
in one year a large part of the corn crop was
devastated by the disease.
Similarly, when wheat was bred for resistance to a
disease called blast, that characteristic was looked at
in isolation, and was encoded into the organism. The
back-up gene for general resistance, however, was
ignored. As a result, the new organism was very
susceptible to all sorts of viruses which, in one
generation, mutated sufficiently to devastate the crop.
What we have then, vis à vis the danger associated
with genetic engineering, is what philosophers call an
a fortiori situation. If such unanticipated conse-
quences can and do occur with traditional breeding,
where one of necessity proceeds slowly, how much the
more so does the danger of unanticipated conse-
quences loom when one is creating transgenic
animals? When one inserts a sequence of DNA (a
gene) into an organism, one cannot anticipate
pleiotropic activities, where the gene affects other
traits one has not anticipated. By the same token, one
may have overlooked the need for more than one gene
to get the desired result phenotypically. Any of these
factors can produce a variety of conditions deleterious
to the organism. The way to control this risk, then,
whether one is doing traditional breeding or trans-
genic shortcuts, is to do a great deal of small-scale
testing before one releases or depends on the new
organism.
The second type of danger resulting from fast-lane
genetic engineering of animals can be illustrated by
reference to food animals. Here the isolated charac-
teristic being engineered into the organism may have
unsuspected harmful consequences to humans who
consume the resultant animal. The deep issue here is
that one can of course genetically engineer traits in
animals without a full understanding of the mechan-
isms involved in phenotypic expression of the traits,
with resulting disaster. Ideally, though this is proba-
bly not possible either in breeding or creating trans-
genics, one can mitigate this sort of danger by being
extremely cautious in one’s engineering until one has
at least a reasonable grasp of the physiological
mechanisms affected by insertion of a given gene.
A third general kind of risk growing out of genetic
engineering replicates and amplifies problems already
inherent in selection by breeding, namely the narrow-
ing of a gene pool, the tendency toward creation of
genetic uniformity, the emergence of harmful reces-
sives, the loss of hybrid vigor, and, of course, the
greater susceptibility of organisms to devastation by
pathogens, as has been shown to be the case in crops.
So, once again, we encounter a problem that
already exists in traditional breeding. As we find the
traits we consider desirable, we try to incorporate
these traits into the organisms we raise, be they plant
or animal. We continue to refine and propagate these
animals and plants until a particular genome
dominates our agriculture. In other words, we put all
our eggs in one basket. The number of strains of
chicken in production of eggs and broilers, for
example, has decreased precipitously since the rise of
large corporate domination of the industry during the
last 40 years. What this means in practical terms is
that the industry stands and falls by what it considers
the few superior genomes it has developed. If circum-
stances change, or if a new pathogen is encountered,
wholesale devastation of the population will of neces-
sity occur and has occurred, for example by Newcas-
tle’s disease or influenza. Loss of genetic diversity
means loss of potential for adaptation to new circum-
stances.
The way in which genetic engineering can acceler-
ate this tendency is clear. Suppose a “superior” animal
is created transgenically with great rapidity. Those
who utilize this animal gain a clear competitive edge,
be it because of increased disease resistance, greater
efficiency in feed conversion, greater productivity, or
whatever. In order to compete, other farmers replace
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their stock with this animal, because old strains are
viewed as obsolete. The entire branch of agriculture
tends toward a monoculture, with the extant gene pool
severely limited. Over a period of time, however,
untoward consequences of the new genome emerge, be
it disease susceptibility, reproductive problems, stress
susceptibility, or some other problem. A potentially
disastrous situation forms because the best sort of
response to the crisis has been lost with the loss of
genetic diversity. Alternatively, social or economic
circumstances may change so as to require change in
agricultural practices or locale such that the extant
genome does not fit well with the new circumstances.
Once again, the presence of a limited gene pool
militates against the sort of quick, reasonable, and
efficacious response that a diverse gene pool would
provide. In the end then, genetic engineering of
animals runs the risk of accelerating the tendency
that is already established in at least certain portions
of animal agriculture (the chicken and egg industry,
for example).
A fourth set of risks arises from the fact that in
certain cases, when one changes animals, one can
thereby alter the pathogens to which they are host.
This can potentially occur in two ways. First, in
genetically engineering for resistance to a given
pathogen in an animal, one unwittingly could create
an environment in the animal favorable to a natural
mutation of that pathogenic microbe to which the
modified animal would not be resistant. These new
organisms then could be infectious to these other
animals, or to humans. (Society already has wit-
nessed such untoward consequences as a result of its
indiscriminate use of antibiotics in medicine and
agriculture. Widespread use of these drugs killed off
susceptible bacteria, and in essence served to select for
bacteria that were resistant to them.)
One possible example of this sort of reaction has
recently been discussed regarding the so-called SCID
mouse developed as a model for AIDS (Lusso et al.,
1990). These animals are genetically engineered to
possess a human immune system and are then
infected with the AIDS virus. Some researchers
suggest that, in such a mouse, the AIDS virus could
become more virulent and infectious by interacting
with native mouse viruses, thereby taking on new
characteristics such as, for example, becoming trans-
missible by contact with the airborne virus. It is for
similar reasons that the National Institutes of Health,
which has developed a different mouse model for
AIDS, took extraordinary precautions to ensure that
the experimental mice could not accidentally escape.
Even if one were to genetically alter an animal
without specifically changing its immune system, one
might inadvertently alter the pathogens to which it is
host indirectly by changing the microenvironment
where they live. This, in turn, could result in these
pathogens becoming dangerous to humans or other
animals. Thus, for example, in altering agricultural
animals such as cattle by genetic engineering, one
runs the risk of affecting the pathogenicity of the
microorganisms that inhabit the organism in
unknown and unpredictable ways. The more precipi-
tous the change, the more difficult it is to estimate the
effects of the pathogens.
A fifth set of risks is ecological, associated with the
possibility of radically altering an animal and then
having it escape into an uncontrolled environment.
Although this might seem to be a minimal danger
when dealing with intensively maintained and strictly
confined swine, chickens, or laboratory animals, it
could pose a real problem with extensively managed
and loosely confined sheep or cattle, as well as with
rodents, or rabbits that may escape despite ordinary
precautions, and, most obviously, with fish. Ex-
perience teaches us that the dangers of releasing
animals into a new environment cannot be estimated,
even with species whose characteristics are well
known. Witness the uncontrollable proliferation of
rabbits and cats released in Australia and the
mongoose in Hawaii, as well as our inability to deal
with the accidental release of killer bees, or imported
snails in our waterways. Ignorance of what could
happen with newly engineered creatures is even more
certain.
A sixth set of risks is also environmental. By now
we are all familiar with the threat to global and
regional ecosystems posed by agricultural expansion
in Third World countries. Slash-and-burn techniques
deployed to provide grazing land for cattle has led to
desertification in some areas (Africa) and dramatic
loss of species in others (South America). What effect
would genetic engineering have on these pernicious
pursuits? The answer is not clear. It could be argued
in favor of genetic engineering that our ability to
genetically adapt animals and plants to indigenous
conditions would halt such practices while allowing for
economic growth. However, it is equally plausible to
suggest that such technology could augment plunder
of the environment by foisting animals on all sorts of
hitherto undisturbed areas with unimaginable conse-
quences. Once again, it is difficult to foresee such
risks.
A seventh set of risks derives from potential
military applications of such technology. It is not
difficult to imagine the sorts of weapons that could be
created using animals as carriers to infect populations
with human pathogens.
Finally, the patenting of genetically engineered
animals poses socio-economic risks. For example,
many farmer groups anticipate that small family
farmers might be forced to acquire expensive patented
animals in order to compete with large corporations
and could well be forced out of business. This, in turn,
might strengthen the ever-increasing tendency of
large agribusiness to monopolize the food supply. We
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have ample evidence from bST and elsewhere that the
public will reject anything that endangers family
farms. The extrapolation of these technologies to Third
World cultures, where adequate regulation is unlikely
and socio-cultural disruption can threaten the social
fabric and way of life, represents another risk in this
category.
Issues of Animal Welfare
Responding to the above concerns is just as much a
matter of prudence as self-interest for those engaged
in genetic engineering, because they are themselves
put at risk by many of the dangers enumerated, and
because any catastrophic outcomes will likely result in
severe restrictions of their activities and in massive
public rejection of the technology. A purely moral
challenge lies in the issue of the welfare of the animals
to be engineered. Because human benefits can and will
likely exact a cost in animals suffering, and there is no
benefit to humans militating in favor of controlling
that suffering, the task of protecting such animals will
be formidable. On the other hand, as I have discussed
elsewhere, social concern for animal welfare has never
been higher in the United States and abroad (Rollin,
1995).
In agriculture, attempts to engineer animals have
been largely based on increasing animal efficiency and
productivity. Based on the history and the develop-
ment of confinement systems in industrialized agricul-
ture, it is clear that if the pain, suffering, and disease
of the animal does not interfere with the economic
productivity, the condition is ignored. (Hence the
existence of the so-called “production diseases” en-
demic to confinement agriculture.) Most important,
there are no legal or regulatory constraints on what
can be done to animals in pursuit of increasing
agricultural productivity, either in agricultural
research or in industry. Given the absence of such
constraints and the historical willingness of industri-
alized agriculture to sacrifice animal welfare for
productivity, the moral problem inherent in geneti-
cally engineering animals for production agriculture is
obvious.
Most of the attempts that have thus far been made
to genetically engineer farm animals have generated
serious welfare problems. For example, attempts to
increase the growth rate and efficiency of pigs and
sheep by insertion of modified genes to control growth,
while achieving that result, have engendered signifi-
cant suffering (Pursel, 1989). The desired results
were to increase growth rates and weight gain in farm
animals, reduce carcass fat, and increase feed effi-
ciency. Although certain of these goals were achieved
(in pigs, rate of gain increased by 15%, feed efficiency
by 18%, and carcass fat was reduced by 80%),
unanticipated effects, with significantly negative im-
pact on the animals’ well-being, also occurred. Life-
shortening pathogenic changes in pigs including
kidney and liver problems were noted in many of the
animals. The animals also exhibited a wide variety of
diseases and symptoms, including lethargy, lameness,
uncoordinated gait, bulging eyes, thickening skin,
gastric ulcers, severe synovitis, degenerative joint
disease, heart disease of various kinds, nephritis, and
pneumonia. Sexual behavior was anomalous; females
were anestrous and boars lacked libido. Other
problems included tendencies toward diabetes and
compromised immune function. The sheep fared better
for the first 6 mo but then became unhealthy.
There are certain lessons to be learned from these
experiments. In the first place, although similar
experiments had been done earlier in mice, mice did
not show many of the undesirable side effects. Thus it
is difficult to extrapolate in a linear way from species
to species when it comes to genetic engineering, even
when, on the surface, the same sort of genetic
manipulation is being attempted.
Second, as we mentioned, it is impossible to effect
simple one-to-one correspondence between gene trans-
fer and the appearance of desired phenotypic traits.
Genes may have multiple effects, and traits may be
under the control of multiple genes. The relevance of
this point to welfare is obvious and analogous to a
point we made earlier about risk: one should be
extremely circumspect in one’s engineering until one
has a good grasp of the physiological mechanisms
affected by a gene or set of genes. A good example of
the welfare pitfalls is provided by recent attempts to
genetically engineer mice to produce greater amounts
of interleukin 4, in order to study certain aspects of
the immune system (Lewis et al., 1993). This, in fact,
surprisingly resulted in these animals experiencing
osteoporosis, a disease resulting in bone fragility,
clearly a welfare problem.
Another example is provided by a recent attempt to
produce cattle genetically engineered for double mus-
cling (G. Niswender, personal communication).
Though the calf was born showing no apparent
problems, within a month it was unable to stand up on
its own, for reasons that are not yet clear. To the
researchers’ credit, the calf was immediately euthana-
tized. Yet another bizarre instance of totally unantici-
pated welfare problems can be found in the situation
where leglessness and cranio-facial malformations
resulted from the insertion of an apparently totally
unrelated gene into mice (McNeish, 1988).
Thus welfare issues arise both in research on
genetically engineered agricultural animals and, more
drastically, in potential commercial production. The
research animal issues can best be handled with
judicious use of anesthesia, analgesia, and, above all,
early end points for euthanasia if there is any
suffering. The issues associated with mass production
of suffering genetically engineered animals must be
dealt with in a different way. For this reason, I have
proposed the “Principle of Conservation of Welfare” to
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guide the agricultural industry (Rollin, 1995). This
principle states that genetically engineered animals
should be no worse off than the parent stock would be if
they were not so engineered, and ideally should be
better off. Genetically engineering disease resistance
(e.g., for Marek’s disease in chickens) is a good
example of the latter case.
Implications
Agricultural scientists cannot ignore the pressing
socio-ethical concerns about genetic engineering of
animals. By meeting the issues head on, they can first
of all separate good ethical coin from bad and avoid
the pernicious consequences of our “Gresham’s law for
ethics.” Second, they can listen to and enter into
dialogue with the public, engage their concerns about
risk, and thereby bridge the gulf of fear and ignorance
distancing ordinary people from this new technology.
Finally, they can help ensure that the unfortunate
tendencies in modern agriculture to place emphasis on
productivity and efficiency above animal well-being
can be checked in this new technology so as to
ascertain that it is “animal friendly” and beneficial to
animals as well as people.
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